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Private Rights and the
Public Good
by Bill D. Nelson'
0
I. Introduction
"Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono"
(The life of the land is perpetuated in righteousness.)'
Perpetuating the "life of the land" is a central theme of
the environmental movement and the driving force behind
much of the environmental legislation at all levels of gov-
ernment. Over the last twenty years, much of the legisla-
tion (and litigation) has focused on control of toxic mate-
rials or leaving natural areas undeveloped and unexploit-
ed. There are times when "righteousness" must assume a
directly active stance against harmful living things, if the
"life of the land" is to be perpetuated. And there are times
when this "righteousness" may conflict with private prop-
erty rights. The focus of this note is the power of state or
local government to protect ecosystems actively by
destroying non-native, invasive plant or animal species,
specifically when this requires intrusion onto private
property.
It seems paradoxical to advocate leaving natural areas
alone while encouraging entry onto any property for the
express purpose of killing some species. Nonetheless, this is
precisely the management scheme required to protect frag-
ile ecosystems from invasive or harmful, non-native plant
species. This sort of management is particularly well suited
to state or local control, more than any existing or conceiv-
able federal program. Such controls elicit very little resis-
tance when applied to public lands, but when applied to pri-
vate property, issues of privacy, due process, and takings
could be raised. This is especially true in an era of strong
public sentiment against government intrusions.
This note discusses application of state or local controls
in controlling non-native plant species, particularly as they
apply to private property, and how courts have viewed the
issues of privacy, due process, and takings in analogous sit-
uations. While case law from several jurisdictions is
reviewed (Florida and California in particular), the primary
statutory focus of this note is on the State of Hawaii. For
illustrative purposes, the note focuses on recent efforts
there to combat a South American invader, miconia calvescens
(miconia). The Hawaiian ecosystem is particularly vulnera-
ble to invasive alien species and the state has statutory
schemes in place to control the entry of alien species, as
well as statutes empowering government agencies to eradi-
cate pest species that somehow gain entry. While seldom
utilized on private property, these eradication statutes are
an increasingly important weapon in limiting the negative
impact of alien pest species.
SJ.D.. 1997, University of California - Hastings College of the Law. The
author wishes to thank Suzanne Case and Alan Holt of the Nature Conser-
vancy; his wife and son, Suzanne and Alex, for their surrenders of time; and,
the staff and editors, especially Greg Whaling, of West-Northwest.
1. Motto of the State of Hawaii, HAW. CONsT. art. XV, § 5; HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 5-9 (Michie 1995).
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II. Background
Hawaiian species are particularly vulnerable to
ecological invasions. 2 While the Hawaiian islands
comprise only two-tenths of one percent of the
United States' total land area, three-quarters of the
nation's extinct plants and birds once lived only in
Hawaii. 3 Today, more than a third of the plants and
birds on America's endangered and threatened
species list are in Hawaii. 4 "By many measures, the
Hawaiian Islands represent the worst-case example
of the [United States' non-indigenous species]
problem. No other area in the United States
receives as many new species annually, nor has as
great a proportion of [non-indigenous speciesl
established in the wild."
5
The isolated evolution of the Hawaiian species
led them to lose many of the defenses common to
continental species.6 The islands of Hawaii are the
most remote land mass in the world, separated
from the continents by thousands of miles of
ocean. Because of this, only a few hundred species
originally arrived by sea or air.7 These in turn
evolved into thousands of unique species prior to
the first human settlement.8 There were no mam-
malian predators or grazers, no ants, mosquitoes
or cockroaches, nor any snakesY The only mam-
mals were a small insect-eating bat and the
Hawaiian monk seal.'
0
2. See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment,
HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES, OTA-F-565
(Sept. 1993) at 235 [hereinafter HARMFUL NISI.
3. See Elizabeth Royte, On the Brink: Hawaii's Vanishing Species,
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1995, at 14.
4. See id.
5. HARMFUL NIS supra note 2, at 234.
6. See Maura Dolan, Sad Aloha to Native Species, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1990, atAl. A26.
7. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 234. Carol Ezzell,




10. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 234.
II. Id.
12. Even non-scientists have recognized the dangers pre-
sented by habitat destruction and humans are perhaps the most
destructive "non-indigenous" species. Congress acknowledged
the effects of habitat destruction in floor statements during con-
sideration of the Endangered Species Act. Senator Tunney
noted: "Many species have been inadvertently exterminated by a
negligent destruction of their habitat. Their habitats have been
... altered so that they are unsuitable environments for natural
populations of fish and wildlife." 119 CONG. REC. 25669
(1973)(statement of Sen. Tunney). Similarly, Representative
"While habitat destruction has been and con-
tinues to be a main factor in the demise of the
indigenous biota, [non-indigenous species] have
been identified as an important, if not the most
important, current threat."" In some cases, a non-
indigenous species can be the cause of habitat
destruction.' 2 This is the situation presented by
miconia calvescens. Dr. Ray Fosberg of the Smithsonian
Institution has characterized miconia, a native of
South and Central America, as "the one plant that
could really destroy the native Hawaiian forest." 3
Introduced to a botanical garden in Tahiti in 1937,
miconia "escaped by bird carried seeds," and over
sixty percent of the island is now heavily invaded
with groves of miconia, replacing native forest and
its wildlife.' 4 Botanists, returning from Tahiti with
dire warnings, convinced the Hawaii Department of
Agriculture (HDOA) to add the plant to its official
noxious weed list in 1992.15 It is believed that prior
to the listing, botanic gardeners brought miconia to
Hawaii. 16
Miconia grows to heights of approximately six-
ty feet and has oval leaves almost a yard long.17 The
velvety or shiny, dark green leaves are purple on the
underside.ls Miconia can thrive in shade or sun-
light.19 It produces such deep shade, however, that
nothing else can grow under it.20 An additional
problem for the environment is miconia's shallow
root system which allows excessive soil erosion.
21
Sullivan noted, "Iflor the most part, the principal threat to ani-
mals stems from destruction of their habitat." Id. at 30162
(1973)(statement of Rep. Sullivan). The Supreme Court recently
agreed that habitat destruction was "harm" under the
Endangered Species Act, as Justice O'Connor observed: "... the
'harm' regulation applies where significant habitat modification,
by impairing essential behaviors, proximately (foreseeably)
causes actual death or injury to identifiable animals that are
protected . Babbitt v. SweetHome Chapter of Communities.
For a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2420 (1995)(O'Connor con-
curring). Here we examine primarily non-human alien species,
such as the feral goats or mouflon sheep discussed in the Palila
cases infra note 28.
13. CONSERVATION COUNCIL FOR HAWAII NoxIous PLANTS TASK
FORCE, FLYER, WANTED: LOCATION OF MICONIA, distributed by Hawaii
Department of Agriculture (1995) [hereinafter WANTEDI.
14. See id.
15. See Patrick Conant, Miconia Calvescens-t's worse than we
thought!, HAWAII's FORESTS AND WILDLIFE, VOLI. IX, No. 4, Winter 1994,
5.
16. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 244-45.
17. See Conant, supra note 15.
18. See WANTED, supra note 13.
19. See id.
20. See Conant, supra note 15.
21. See WANTED, supra note 13.
Bill D. Nelson Volume 4, Number 1
Summer 1997 Controllinn Harmful Non-Naflve Plants at Local Levels
Finally, the tree produces hundreds of small, pink
fruits, each containing about 150 seeds. The fruit is
attractive to some birds which spread the seeds
great distances.2 2 The plant has been described as
"the botanical equivalent of rabbits" because of
these properties. 23 Throughout this note, miconia
will be used for illustrative purposes, especially in
application of the relevant Hawaii statutes.
III. Local or State Response vs. Federal Response
Existing Federal statutes are not particularly
well-suited for response to threats posed to ecosys-
tems by alien species. While a part of a comprehen-
sive plan, existing regulations, such as the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)
24 and the Lacey Act 25
are directed toward preservation or prevention,
which does not address the problem of invasion by
non-native species.
A. Endangered Species Act
Probably the most widely discussed preserva-
tion-oriented statute is the ESA.26 The ESA seeks to
use federal action to conserve endangered species
by protecting the ecosystems upon which these
species depend.2 7 While a comprehensive analysis
of the ESA is beyond the scope of this note, some
discussion illustrates its shortcoming in addressing
invasive alien species.
The decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Babbitt v. SweetHome Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon upheld the Secretary of the Interior's
definition of "harm" under the ESA to include "sig-
nificant habitat modification or degradation that
actually kills or injures wildlife."28 Nonetheless,
what constitutes "significant" is subject to judicial
or agency interpretation. 29 In the case of a plant
such as miconia, efforts to control it may be too late
22. See id.
23. HAPRFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 245.
24. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1544 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
25. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-3378 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
26. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1531-1544, supra note 24.
27. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 153 1(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
28. Babbitt v. SweetHome Chapter of Communities for a
Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
29. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30. See WANTED, supra note 13 and text accompanying note 14.
- 31. This was a series of cases and subsequent appeals
brought by environmental groups on behalf of the Palila, a bird,
against the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources.
by the time habitat modification is deemed "signif-
icant." The existence of a few isolated miconia trees
in yards might not be considered a "significant habi-
tat modification." But when the seeds from those
few trees are deposited, by the thousands, by birds
into critical habitat areas, it would probably be both
significant and too late. The experience of Tahiti
with miconia supports this scenario.
30
This is the difficulty presented by a single tree
on private property. A botanical garden or an indi-
vidual's yard would not be described as "habitat" in
a hypothetical ESA action to control miconia.
Therefore, although a single tree on private proper-
ty could produce thousands of seeds thereby affect-
ing ecosystems beyond the confines of the proper-
ty, the mere existence of the tree might not fall with-
in the ambit of the ESA.
Finally, the many years required to litigate ESA
claims limits its effectiveness in controlling such
aggressive alien species. For example, in the Palila
cases 31 in Hawaii, the plaintiffs gave formal written
notice of alleged violation of the ESA in June 1976.
The first suit was filed in January 197832 and, follow-
ing appeal from the Federal District Court, a deci-
sion affirming that court was signed in February
1981.33 Thus, it took nearly five years of litigation for
the courts to require the Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources to remove harmful
feral sheep and goats from an area deemed critical
habitat for an endangered bird. Another alien
specie, the mouflon sheep, was not the subject of
the original suit, and a second series of adjudica-
tions was required to order their removal.3 4 This
delayed protection of the habitat for an additional
four years.35 If a single plant is capable of producing
over 200,000 seeds per season,36 litigation over a
period of years would seriously undermine control
efforts.
The groups eventually prevailed in their efforts to require the
agency to remove non-indigenous grazing animals from an area
on the slopes of Mauna Kea deemed to be critical habitat for the
Palila. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471
F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979) [hereinafter Palila 11; Palila v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land 8 Natural Resources, 639 E2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter Palila IIl; Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986) [hereinafter Palila 1111;
Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Palila IV[.
32. See Palila 1, supra note 31.
33. See Palila I1, supra note 31.
34. See Palila Ill and Palila IV, supra note 31.
35. See id.
36. WANTED, supra note 13.
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B. Lacey Act
The federal invasive species prevention strategy
is best exemplified by the Lacey Act.37 The Act
makes it unlawful to import, export, transport, sell
or purchase fish, wildlife or plants taken, held or
sold in violation of any law, treaty or regulation of
the United States.3 8 But the Act's regulations are
very narrow in scope because they prohibit import-
ing only the most egregious alien species. Except
for fruits and vegetables, a specie may be imported
into the United States unless the Department of
Interior has listed it as injurious.3 9 "However, by the
time a species is listed as injurious, it may have
been imported and subsequently escaped or
released into the ambient environment.-40 This
method of preventing the spread of alien species
has limitations inherent in its approach to the prob-
lem.
The approach of the Lacey Act, to list injurious
species, has been described as the "dirty list"
approach.4' In 1976, the Department of Interior
abandoned plans for a "clean list" approach which
would have allowed introductions only upon a
showing of low risk.42 The advantage of a "clean list"
approach is that the burden of showing that an
unlisted species is not harmful is placed on the
importer or-possessor of the species.43 Over half the
states employ "dirty list" approaches, while Hawaii
is the only state using a "clean list" system for both
37. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 3371-3378, supra note 25.
38. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 3372(a) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
39. See John L. Dentler, Noah's Farce: The Regulation and Control
of Exotic Fish and Wildlife, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REv. 191, 211 (Fall
1993).
40. Id.
41. See Julianne Kurdila, The Introduction of Exotic Species into the
United States: There Goes The Neighborhood!. 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
95, 104 (Fall. 1988).
42. See id. at 105.
43. See George Laycock, The Importation of Animals. SIERRA. Apr.
1978, at 20, 23.
44. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 210. The Hawaiian sys-
tem is actually considerably more complex. The Hawaii Board of
Agriculture maintains five lists. Three lists are dedicated to ani-
mals and micro-organisms: (1) conditionally approved (permit
required for importation); (2) restricted (permit required for both
importation and possession); and (3) prohibited. Any animal or
micro-organism not on either of the first two lists is prohibited.
There are two lists maintained for plants: those plants that may
be imported with permit and those that are prohibited. However,
unlike the animal lists, there is no presumption that a plant not
listed is prohibited. See The Nature Conservancy of Hawaii &
Natural Resources Defense Council, The Alien Pest Species Invasion in
Hawaii: Background Study and Recommendations for Interagency Planning
17 (luly 1992) [hereinafter Background Studyl (unpublished study,
on file with the Hastings West.Northwest Journal of Environmental Law
and Policy).
importation and release of all major fish and
wildlife groups. 4 Nonetheless, Hawaii's wild non-
indigenous plant species are approaching the num-
ber of indigenous species.45 Some additional con-
trols are needed.46 Prevention mechanisms, such as
the Lacey Act or Hawaii's own stringent "clean list"
system for fish and wildlife, have already failed
when an alien species escapes into an existing
ecosystem.
An additional limitation of the Lacey Act is that
it applies only to intentional importations of alien
species.47 Unintentional introductions of species
have been and continue to be a significant prob-
lem.
48
C. Local or State Response
Almost all states maintain lists of weeds pro-
hibited, for protection of agriculture, beyond those
listed by the federal Noxious Weed Act.49 As noted
above, over half employ "dirty list" approaches.
"Relatively few states, however, have natural area
weed laws, that is, plant prohibitions separate from
agricultural quarantines. The lack of such prohibi-
tions in most states has left them unable to address
some harmful [non-indigenous species] .... "50
Unfortunately, such listing programs are inade-
quately funded to undertake serious enforcement.5'
Even California, the leading agricultural state, a rare
state that employs both border agricultural inspec-
45. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 236.
46. Ironically, federal treaties may weaken measures such as
Hawaii's "clean list" approach. As an adjunct to NAFTA. the fed-
eral government has adopted provisions to prevent state laws
from pre-empting these international pacts. These provisions
have already been invoked to override State of Hawaii complaints
against the importation of ivy gourd, a known pest, into the
United States. Promotion of trade is expected to further expose
Hawaii to international pest traffic. See Susan Machida & Wendy
Schultz, Hawaii Alien Species Action Plan, A Multi-Agency Commitment,
7-8 (October 19.1994, reformatted February 10, 1995) [hereinafter
Action Plan] (unpublished working document, on file with Hastings
WesteNorthwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy).
47. Criminal penalty under the Lacey Act requires that the
violator "knowingly" import or export in violation of the Act or
"knowingly" engages in conduct prohibited by the Act. See 16
U.S.C.S. § 3373(d) (Law. Co-op. 1996). Civil liability under the Act
requires that a person engage in conduct violating the Act (other
than marking or false labeling sections) and "in the exercise of
due care should know" the fish, wildlife or plants were in violation
of a law treaty or regulation. See id. at § 3373(a).
48. See Ezzell, supra note 7, at 314-15.
49. 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 2801-13 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
50. HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 221. "A trend exists to
adopt non-agicultural weed prohibitions.... Washington, for
example, has recently adopted detailed regulations on [thirty-
ninel natural area weeds." id.
51. See id. at 225.
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tions and several pest eradication programs, is expe-
riencing only limited success in preventing the intro-
duction of new alien pest species.5 2 "Some local gov-
ernments have ordinances covering harmful [non-
indigenous species]. Generally, local authority has
not included imposing quarantines or prohibiting
importation of particular [alien speciesl ...."I'
Plant pest or pest control laws offer one possi-
ble method for responding to threats from alien
species. 5 4 "Local authority has predominated in the
control of agricultural weeds in many western
Isltates, in the form of weed control districts."55
Such statutes are related to nuisance abatement
laws and are particularly well suited to these situa-
tions.56 Because these laws originate with state or
local government agencies, there is less stigma of
"big government" common to criticisms of federal
laws such as the ESA.
The greatest benefits may lie in early detection
and early response to harmful non-indigenous
species. The numbers of state and local employees,
combined with visits to a variety of geographic loca-
tions required by various job assignments, vastly
increases the potential number of "spotters" in an
area. Law enforcement personnel, locally based fed-
eral agents, agricultural agents, and land and natural
resources employees, augmented by volunteers from
environmental groups, would be a significant force in
detecting species such as miconia. Once identified, a
local response would be the quickest and most logi-
cal method of eradiating the offending species.
52. See id. at 225. California detected three agriculturally sig-
nificant new [non-indigenous species in 1990. See id. at 225-27.
53. Id. at 229.
54. One observer has suggested use of tort liability, gener-
ally through strict liability in public nuisance suits, as another
solution to the problems associated with accidental introduction
of alien species. See Daniel P. Larsen. Combatting the Exotic Species
Invasion: The Role of Tort Liability, 5 DUKE ENV. L. & PoLNv F 21 (1995).
The author acknowledges some potential difficulties with his sug-
gested approach, including problems in proving causation. See id.
at 57. IVermont assesses treble damages against importers of
illegal exotic animal species for expenses incurred in their con-
trol. See HARMFUL NIS. supra note 2; at 218.1 However, when more
than one individual might own a tree such as miconia in a geo-
graphical region and when additional specimens might occur on
public lands unbeknownst to investigators, tort liability appears
to have limited utility. It is also questionable whether a seriously
invaded, fragile, and unique ecosystem could be repaired
through any money damges awarded (after lengthy litigation).
55. HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 230.
56. There can also be problems with such laws. For example,
sometimes indigenous species are listed as pest species,
because they are hardy enough to crowd out some decorative or
agricultural exotic species. See Bret Rappaport. As Natural
Landscaping Takes Root We Must Weed Out the Bad Laws-How Natural
Landscaping and Leopold's Land Ethic Collide with Unenlightened Weed
Such a system is not without pitfalls. Beyond
the legal challenges that private landowners may
raise, there may be jurisdictional questions. For
example, which governmental entities or agencies
will take responsibility for which tasks under such a
scheme? Answers to these questions may turn on
such issues as agency expertise or availability of
funding. These problems should be addressed by
the responsible government agencies as early as
possible because, as noted earlier, eradication
efforts will be impeded by lost time.57
IV. Relevant Hawaii Statutes
The statutes relevant to control of miconia are
found in Hawaii Revised Statutes, sections 141-3,
141-3.5 and 141-3.6.58 Section 141-3 empowers the
State Department of Agriculture to designate harm-
ful species as pests and to eradicate such pests,
providing certain emergency powers in specific situ-
ations. 59 Section 141-3.5 mandates that the
Department of Agriculture "develop and imple-
ment" detailed eradication programs using best
available technology for any pest designated under
section 141-3.6o Finally, section 141-3.6 specifically
sets out notice requirements and authority for
members of the Department of Agriculture (or any
agent authorized by the Department) to enter onto
private property for the purpose of carrying out the
eradication program.6 1 Section 141-3.6 specifically
limits liability to "acts beyond the scope of the per-
Laws and What Must Be Done About It, 26 1. MARSHALL L. REV. 865
(1993).
57. Florida provides one model for coordinating efforts.
When Florida found that environmental threats posed by non-
indigenous water weeds were crossing political and jurisdiction-
al boundaries, the Exotic Pest Plant Council (EPPC) was formed
to coordinate efforts in developing management programs. EPPC
is an organization of forty member agencies and groups, local
and private. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2, at 264. Hawaii has
started a similar group supported with funding from the state and
donated staff support from The Nature Conservancy of Hawaii,
the Natural Resources Defense Council and the University of
Hawaii Department of Regional and Urban Planning. Participants
in the group include representatives from the above organiza-
tions as well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Customs
service, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, U.S. National Park Service, the Hawaii Sugar Planters
Association, Maui Pineapple Company, The U.S. Army, The U.S.
Air Force, and others. See generally Action Plan, supra note 45.
58. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-3. 141-3.5, 141-3.6 (Michie
1996).
59. See id. § 141-3.
60. See id. § 141-3.5.
61. See id. § 141-3.6. This section of the statute was altered
by amendment in 1992. Previously, private landowners were not
required to cooperate with eradication programs.
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son's authority, or the person's negligence, gross
negligence or intentional misconduct. '62 This sec-
tion also provides that if entry is refused, a district
court may issue a warrant directing police to assist
the department or agent in gaining entry.63 Note
that section 141-3.6 allows the Department of
Agriculture to authorize any agent to enter onto pri-
vate property in order to carry out the eradication
program. This suggests that the state could autho-
rize local officials or even private contractors to
assist in carrying out the law.
The Plant Pest Control Branch (PPC) of the
Hawaii Department of Agriculture's Plant Industry
Division has primary responsibility for controlling
plant pests.64 Pursuant to statute, the Department
has developed procedures to designate pest
species as well as procedures for eradication and
control of noxious weeds. 65 The Department's regu-
lations define a noxious weed as "those plant
species determined to be or likely to become injuri-
ous, harmful, or deleterious to the agricultural
industry, forest and recreational areas, and conser-
vation districts of the State and which are designat-
ed and listed as noxious weeds .... "6 Control or
eradication activities may involve direct PPC action
or cooperative agreement with landowners and
lessees.67 Recent direct action, noxious weed eradi-
cation targets of the PPC have included turkeyberry,
fountain grass, firetree and ivy-leaved gourd.68
V. Property Owner Objections
There are no reported cases in Hawaii of prop-
erty owners objecting to plant pest eradication.
Most designated pest plants are viewed as pests by
the owners of the land as well as the Department of
Agriculture. Nonetheless, some eradication efforts
have been hampered because some private proper-
ty owners have been hesitant to allow state crews
onto their property.69 Miconia is frequently
described as an attractive plant, and it is believed it
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-3, 141-3.5, 141-3.6, 152-2,
152-3, 152-4, 152-5, 152-6 (Michie 1996). See also Hawaii Dep't of
Agric. Regulations, Title 4, Subtitle 6, ch. 69A (effective Sept. 4,
1993)[hereinafter Haw. Dep't Agric. Regs. ch. 69AI.
65. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-3, 141-3.5. 141-3.6, 152-2,
152-3. 152-4, 152-5, 152-6. supra note 64.
66. Hawaii Dep't of Agric. Regs, ch. 69A-2, supra note 64.
67. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-6(d), (e) (Michie 1996). In
practice, cooperative weed control projects with landowners or
lessees are normally for five years and commit the Department of
Agriculture to "provide technical expertise and herbicides, while
the private party provides equipment and labor." Background Study,
was originally brought to the islands as an orna-
mental plant or specimen for botanical gardens.
7 0
Perhaps because of a perceived value, miconia con-
trol may face resistance.
Landowner objections to enforcement of the
Hawaii pest control statutes would probably fall
into two broad categories. First, the statutes might
be challenged as violating privacy rights protected
by the Hawaiian Constitution: 'T1e right of the peo-
ple to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest."7' This provision of the Hawaiian
Constitution affords greater privacy rights than the
federal right to privacy.
7 2
A second challenge would emanate from claims
of takings which may arise under the Constitution.
"No person shall.. .be deprived of.. .without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."7 3 A sim-
ilar provision in the state constitution may also be
a source of challenges. "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."74 Due process claims could arise in
the context of either privacy or takings.
VI. Privacy Rights and Due Process
There is no Hawaiian case directly on point
involving violation of a privacy right through
enforcement of a local nuisance ordinance. Such
cases are relatively rare nationally. However, one
case arose under a city ordinance in Ferndale,
Michigan, that prohibited grass or weeds over seven
inches tall. In People v. McKendrick,75 a private con-
tractor carried out orders from the city to cut grass
and weeds on McKendrick's property pursuant to
the ordinance. When a worker discovered marijuana
growing in containers along the back fence, police
were notified, leading to McKendrick's arrest. The
Court of Appeals of Michigan held that there was no
violation of McKendrick's privacy rights nor an
supra note 44, at 32. If the private party declines to renew after five
years, the agreement requires he keep the infestation level at, or
below that achieved at the end of the five years for an additional
five years. Id.
68. See Background Study, supra note 44, at 39.
69. See id. at 61.
70. See Conant, supra note 15.
71. HAW. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
72. See State v. Kam. 748 P.2d 372, 377 (1988).
73. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
74. HAW. CONsT. art. 1, § 20.
75. People v. McKendrick, 468 NW. 2d 903 (Mich. App. 1991).
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unlawful search and seizure violating Fourth
Amendment rights.76 The court reasoned that for a
search to be proscribed by the Fourth Amendment:
(1) the police must have instigated, encouraged, or
participated in the search, and (2) the person must
have participated in the search with the intent of
assisting the police in their investigation.
77
Other types of administrative inspections and
searches may be analagous to the provisions for
entry onto private property included in the Hawaii
pest control statutes. For example, agricultural
inspections are a type of search that implicates pri-
vacy interests. A Florida Case involved an individual
who neglected to stop for an agricultural inspection
station, a highway patrol officer escorted him back
to the station.78 The inspector detected a locked
compartment, and, after the driver refused to open
it, he obtained a regulatory search warrant that led
to the discovery of over 500 pounds of marijuana.
79
The defendant sought to overturn his drug traffick-
ing conviction on the basis of an illegal search. The
court distinguished the purpose of the search, an
agricultural inspection based on neutral criteria,
from those in a criminal context.8 0 Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Camara v. Muncipal
Court,81 the search was upheld as constitutional
because such "administrative" searches do not
require the same level of probable cause as criminal
searches.8 2 "Camara makes explicit that the probable
cause measured is probable cause to believe that
property in that general area or class may be sus-
ceptible to harboring or fostering the harm the
administrative or regulatory scheme seeks to ame-
liorate., 83 In a regulatory scheme of pest control
regulations like Hawaii's, property "susceptible to
harboring" a harm such as miconia will generally be
distinguishable, based on neutral criteria, from
property singled out for a criminal search. (The
notice requirement alone would seem to allow for
76. See id. at 911.
77. See id. at 910, citing United States v. Coleman, 628 F2d
961, 965 (6th Cir. 1980); See also United States v. Howard, 752 E2d
220, 227 (6th Cir. 1985).
78. See Roche v. Florida, 462 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 1987).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1099.
81. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
82. Roche, 462 So. 2d at 1100.
83. Id.
84. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
85. Id. at 312-13.
86. See id. at 320. But see Salwasser Mfg. Co.. Inc. v. Municipal
Court for Fresno, 94 Cal. App. 3d 223 (1979) (holding that since
destruction or secreting of any criminal evidence.)
Inspections or searches of property pursuant to
OSHA regulations were upheld in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.84 The Supreme Court recognized that "[ilf the
government intrudes on a person's property
[whether a home or commercial property], the pri-
vacy interest suffers whether the government's
motivation is to investigate criminal laws or breach-
es of other statutory or regulatory standards."85
Nonetheless, the majority adopted the Camara
standard that warrants authorizing regulatory
searches do not require probable cause in the crim-
inal sense.
86
Camara87 dealt with warrantless building
inspections. The Court noted that "because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they
involve a relatively limited invasion of ... privacy.
88
The entry onto property contemplated in the pest
eradication program gives rise to no criminal penal-
ty for possession of the harmful plant, is not aimed
at discovering evidence of crime and is not person-
al in nature. It should meet the standard set by the
Camara line of cases.
89
The defendant in McKendrick 9° also asserted that
his rights to due process had been violated because
the ordinance provided no specific opportunity to
be heard in a formal hearing. The court disagreed,
noting that under the applicable ordinance, "viola-
tors are given sufficient notice of the violation, rea-
sonable time in which to take steps to remedy the
violation and notice that a failure to comply with
the ordinance will result in abatement by the city,
its employees, or agents."9' The court noted that a
property owner who disagreed with a determination
of violation "could contact the weed and grass
inspector for further clarification" and could appeal
violations to the circuit court.92 "IDlue process in
this case does not require a preabatement hearing"
Cal/OSHA inspections carried possible criminal penalities, prob-
able cause in a criminal sense is required to issuance of a warrant
after a business owner refuses voluntary inspection).
87. Camara. 387 U.S. 523.
88. Id. at 537.
89. But see Crosby v. Texas, 750 S.W. 2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (Officer acted beyond the scope of an Alcoholic Beverage
Commission regulation by using search provisions as subterfuge
to gain entry into an entertainer's dressing room).
90. People v. McKendrick, 468 N.W. 2d 903, 906 (Mich. App.
1991).
91. Id. at 909. The ordinance here allowed the notice to be
published twice in a "general circulation" newspaper and allowed
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to meet constitutional guarantees, the court con-
cluded. 93
Early nuisance cases similarly noted that these
actions by government are not incompatible with
due process rights:
The principle, that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, was embodied, in sub-
stance, in the constitutions of nearly all, if
not all, of the States at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and it has never been regarded as incom-
patible with the principle-equally vital,
because essential to the peace and safety
of society-that all property in this country
is held under the implied obligation that
the owner's use of it shall not be injurious
to the community.94
"Generally, special or summary proceedings for
abatement or nuisances are valid where they afford
the essential elements of due process of law, name-
ly, notice and an opportunity to be heard."95 The rel-
evant Hawaii statute specifies that the "department
of agriculture shall give at least five days notice to
the landowner and occupier of any private property
of its intention to enter the property for the control
or eradication of a pest."96 The notice must set forth
all pertinent information on the pest control pro-
gram, including procedures and methods to be used
for control or eradication. 9 Notice by certified mail
to the landowner's last known address is sufficient.9 8
As noted by the court in McKendrick, under the
ordinance there, a preabatement hearing is not nec-
93. See id. at 910.
94. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (a statute
banning the brewing of beer was held within a state's police
power, thus requiring no compensation although the brewer's
equipment was severely reduced in value if it could not be used
for its intended purpose).
95. McKendrick, 468 NW. 2d at 909.
96. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-3.6 (a) (Michie 1996).
Implications of the requirement to notify both the owner and
occupier deserve some mention. A court in Minnesota addressed
the issue in Schleusner v. Murray County, 416 N.W.2d 478 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987). In Scheusner, weed eradication authorities used cer-
tified mail to notifiy only the owner of the property (a farmhouse
on the property was unoccupied) regarding the need to control
noxious weeds. See id. at 479. The owner of the land made no
effort to contact a farmer renting the land and reponsible for
keeping the land free from noxious weeds. See id. The court held
that ordinary use of land and taking profit from it constituted
occupancy; actual residence was not necessary. See id. at 481.
Noting that the county failed to post public notice on the land or
mail notice to the house on the land, while aware that the land
essary to fulfill the "opportunity to be heard"
requirement.9 9 The Hawaii statute is silent regard-
ing a specific procedure providing an opportunity to
be heard.'0 But this is not problematic if the hold-
ing of the McKendrick court is followed. 10 1
In Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. County of Honolulu,
appellants claimed that their aesthetic or environ-
mental interests constituted property and that hear-
ings before the Department of Land Use, Zoning
Committee and City Council did not constitute due
process.0 2 "Due process is not a fixed concept requir-
ing a specific procedural course in every situation."103
The Hawaii Supreme Court did not find that those
interests rose to the level of property, but went on to
discuss the procedural due process claim:
Determination of the specific procedures
required to satisfy due process requires the
balancing of several factors: (1) the private
interest which will be affected; (2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures actually used,
and the probable value, if any, of addition-
al or alternative procedural safeguards;
and (3) the governmental interest, includ-
ing the burden that additional procedural
safeguards would entail.1
0 4
The Hawaii Supreme Court found adequate
opportunity to be heard in public hearings in the
Sandy Beach Defense Fund case. 105 Sandy Beach Defense
Fund seems to suggest that, in order to fulfill due
process in a regulatory scheme, the opportunity to
be heard need not be in a judicial forum, as long as
procedures are not arbitrary. °6 "The constitution
was under cultivation (crops were growing), the court found the
county lacked jurisdiction to order the eradication. See id. at 482.
97. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-3.6 (a) (Michie 1996).
98. See id.
99. See McKendrick, 468 N.W. 2d at 909.
100. The statute notes that if, after notice, entry is refused,
"the department member or agent may apply to the district court
in the circuit in which the property is located for a warrant to
enter on the premises to effectuate the purposes" of the statute.
See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-3.6 (b) (Michie 1996).
101. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
102. See Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City and County of
Honolulu, 773 P.2d 250, 260 (Haw. 1989).
103. Id. at 261.
104. Id.; accord Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976).
105. Sandy Beach, 773 P.2d at 261-62.
106. See id. at 261-63.
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guarantees the right to be heard, not the right to
have one's views adopted. Neither does the consti-
tution establish the contested case as the only
forum for ensuring a property owner's right to be
heard."1
07
While there were procedural differences
between Honolulu and other counties noted in the
Sandy Beach case, these did not violate equal pro-
tection guarantees. 08 For purposes of the Hawaii
statutes relating to pest control, this aspect of the
holding may be significant. Aside from the applica-
tion to a district court for a warrant, Hawaii Revised
Statute section 141-3.6 is not specific about the
procedures providing the opportunity to be heard.
Within the sphere of Camara-type regulatory
actions, Hawaii case law seems to suggest that each
jurisdiction (or enforcing agency) may adopt its own
hearing procedures, or that the Department of
Agriculture could set a statewide procedure. If the
notice, sent by the Department of Agriculture, con-
tains reference to an opportunity to be heard, the
exact forum, if not uniform statewide, will need to
be coordinated with the authorities on each island
or each governmental unit assigned the task of
hearing landowner objections. Ultimately, only an
opportunity to be heard must be provided. If a
landowner chooses not to avail herself of the oppor-
tunity or actively frustrates it, the opportunity
requirement is still met.
VII. Takings
Amendment V of the Constitution of the United
States states: "No person shall be ... deprived of...
property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."1 0 The Hawaiian state constitution
provides similar guarantees." I
The United States Supreme Court long ago
distinguished nuisance abatement from unlawful
taking:
107. Medeiros v. Hawaii County Planning Commission, 797
P.2d 59. 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990).
108. See Sandy Beach, 773 P.2d at 262-63.
110. U. S. CONsT. amend. V.
111. See HAW. CONST. art 1. §§ 5 & 20.
112. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
113. id. at 667.
114. See Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot
for an Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
115. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385.
418-24 (1977) (suggesting that compensation should partly
depend upon whether the govemment acted to abate a nuisance).
The exercise of the police power by the
destruction of property which is itself a
public nuisance, or the prohibition of its
use in a particular way, whereby its value
becomes depreciated, is very different from
taking property for public use, or from
depriving a person of his property without
due process of law. In the one case, a nui-
sance only is abated; in the other, unof-
fending property is taken away from an
innocent owner.' 12
Control of miconia or similar designated pests
through statutes such as those under discussion
would be exercises of the state's police powers to
abate nuisances. Property is not being taken for
public use here; property is being destroyed to
protect the public welfare. "To regulate and abate
nuisances is one of [the] ordinary functions lof a
state's police power]."" 3 Takings analysis general-
ly proceeds on two levels: first, does the regula-
tion exceed "police power" limitations, and sec-
ond, even if a legitimate exercise of police power,
does the regulation nevertheless constitute a tak-
ing. 114 Police power is strongest when the govern-
ment acts to prevent property owners "by a nox-
ious use of their property, to inflict injury upon
the community."' 1 5 Abatement statutes will gener-
ally be acknowledged as legitimate exercises of
police power in preventing harm to the larger
community. The second part of the takings analy-
sis is exemplified by Justice Holmes' declaration
that land use regulations constitute a taking if
they go "too far."" 6 But the ambiguity inherent in
that declaration ("too far" being extremely subjec-
tive) continues to be an area of.tension on the
Supreme Court." 7 For purposes of the pest con-
trol statutes, it may be enough to note that the
Court has held that government may confiscate all
inherent value in property as long as the regula-
tion "involves the adjustment of rights for the
116. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16
(1922).
117. Compare Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (state's regula-
tion that certain coal must be left in place to prevent surface sub-
sidence is a taking of mining company's property) with Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-94
(1987) (a statute virtually identical to that in Pennsylvania Coal is
not a taking because it does not make overall operation of the
mines unprofitable and state has a substantial interest in pre-
venting subsidence). The Court has also used "reasonableness"
and means/ends analysis in deciding when police power goes
"too far." Compare Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962) (using "reasonableness") with Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 828, 834-40 (1987) (employing means/ends
scrutiny).
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public good,"'"18 leaves the property owner in
physical possession of the property involved, and
does not "extinguish a fundamental attribute of
ownership."119 While a pest plant must be
removed "for the public good," property owners
are free to plant non-pest species, retain title to
the underlying land and exercise those attributes
of ownership common to the jurisdiction.
The power to abate nuisances has been direct-
ed at plants on private property and challenged in
court. The right of government to act in these cases
has been supported by the courts with few
restraints. A Virginia statute providing for compul-
sory cutting down of red cedar trees within two
miles of any apple orchard when officials deter-
mined the cedars to be the source of a communica-
ble plant disease constituting a threat to the
orchards was held not to violate the Constitution. 120
Under the statute, "ten or more reputable freehold-
ers" could request that the state entomologist con-
duct an investigation of suspect red cedars.' 2 1 The
actual decision regarding destruction of the trees
was thus left to a state official. The United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs property was
"not subjected to the possibly arbitrary and irre-
sponsible action of a group of private citizens."
22
The cedars were in no danger themselves from the
plant disease, but were destroyed because they
threatened the apple orchards. The Court acknowl-
edged in Miller v. Schoene that the state was forced to
choose preservation of one property over another,
but noted that taking no action would be as much a
choice, since it would result in injury to the other
property.'23 Similarly, while miconia on private
property may present no danger to that property (at
least in the owner's perception), the miconia could
threaten other interests.
Recently, Florida and California have grappled
with takings issues in enforcement of pest control
ordinances. The Florida cases are of particular inter-
est here because their context is destruction of
plants on private property by the State Department
118. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,65 (1979).
119. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255. 262 (1980).
120. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
121. Id. at 281. A "freeholder" was a landowner as opposed
to a tenant farmer.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 279.
124. It should be noted that pest eradication programs that
utilize "indiscriminate spraying" of herbicicides may have greater
constitutional implications, primarily because of the potential
human health effects from exposure to toxins. See Kristen C.
Chapin, Comment, Pest Eradication Programs and Fundamental Rights:
of Agriculture and Consumer Services, with the
cooperation of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA). The California cases arose in
the context of that state's emergency responses to
the appearance of the Mediterranean fruit fly (med-
fly) in order to protect the agriculture industry.
124
Sanctions against those that violated emergency
regulations and takings claims relating to injuries
to property incidental to the control program are
among the issues that arose.
A. Florida
"Citrus canker, a virulent disease which first
appeared in Florida in 1914, was detected in a cen-
tral Florida tree nursery in August, 1984."'25 The
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services ordered citrus trees destroyed pursuant to
statutory authority.126 Several cases have arisen
concerning protection of the state's citrus industry
under these laws. Because the statutes are basical-
ly pest ordinances directed at plants (albeit dis-
eased ones) and because the primary purpose of
the statutes, like those in Hawaii, is protection of
the state agricultural industry, the Florida courts
have grappled with due process and takings issues
similar to those predicted to arise in eradication of
miconia (or similar invasive plant species) on pri-
vate lands.
In Denney v. Conner, a property owner asserted
that "the [agriculture] department's order mandat-
ing the destruction of 'healthy' trees amountledl to
a violation of Ithe owner's] constitutional right to
due process." 27 After acknowledging that they were
aware of no case "holding that a healthy plant or
animal not imminently dangerous may be
destroyed without compensation to the owner,"
28
the court went on to observe that, "in cases of obvi-
ous and immediate danger, the state, in the exercise
of its police power, may summarily, destroy private
property in order to protect the public."'129 In Denney,
the plaintiff sought injunctive relief to stop the
destruction of his trees, but the court found that
Evolving Constitutional Concerns and the Case for Strict Scrutiny Judicial
Review, 22 ENVrL. L. 1067 (1992).
125. Nordmann v. Florida Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs..
473 So. 2d 278 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).
126. In this mid-1980s eradication project, ultimately
deemed "successful," at least eighteen million young citrus trees
were destroyed. See HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2. at 264.
127. Denney v. Conner, 462 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Ct. App.
1985).
128. Id. (quoting Corneal v. State Plant Board, 95 So. 2d I (Fla.
1957))(emphasis in original).
129. Id.
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"the department stateld] with sufficient particulari-
ty facts which indicate an immediate threat to the
public health, safety or welfare in order to justify"
the action. °30 In allowing the department to go for-
ward with destruction of the trees, the-court noted,
"we do not attempt to determine whether appel-
lants' trees are in fact healthy or diseased. Nor do
we address the issue of compensation. We hold
only.. .that the threat is of sufficient imminence and
scope to justify the emergency order entered by the
department."'3' Thus, we may infer that before list-
ing a plant as a "pest" and developing an eradica-
tion program, a government agency should estab-
lish that there is imminent danger to the public
health, safety or welfare. However, once a legisla-
ture has charged an agency with such duties, any
ambiguous language in the statute becomes sub-
ject to interpretation by the agency and the
Supreme Court has held that deference to agency
interpretation will generally decide such issues.
32
The Florida law was again challenged on the
grounds that trees that showed no sign of disease
did not present "imminent" danger.'33 The court
again upheld the law noting "the critical fact" that
the disease could lay dormant for several months
while being transmitted via wind, rain, man or
machine.' 34 A similar "critical fact" in the case of
miconia is the ease by which the seeds are spread
by birds over great distances.'35 It might appear that
a single tree poses no danger, but miles away, in a
protected and little visited rainforest area, count-
less seeds from that single tree might take root,
mature, and cause significant damage before being
discovered.
The question of compensation for the property
owners reached the Florida Supreme Court after the
department burned over 270,000 trees and "bud-
wood" belonging to two growers in a span of thir-
teen days. 136 In this case, the Florida Supreme Court
found that a taking had occurred because the
"destruction of healthy trees benefitted the entire
130. Id.
131. Id. at 537.
132. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 866.
133. See Nordmann, 473 So. 2d at 279.
134. See id. at 280.
135. See WANTED. supra note 13.
136. See Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-
Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101. 102 (Fla. 1988).
137. Id. at 103.
138. See id. at 102
citrus industry and, in turn, Florida's economy,
thereby conferring a public benefit rather than pre-
venting a harm."'3 7 Not all of the trees destroyed
were identified as diseased before the department
burned them. 138 The compensation was limited to
healthy plants because "the constitutional require-
ment of 'just compensation' clearly does not com-
pel the state to reimburse the owner for the proper-
ty destroyed because such property is valueless,
incapable of any lawful use, and a source of public
danger."'39 This suggests that if a plant is declared a
pest and can no longer be legally cultivated, it
would be valueless for compensation purposes. If a
plant were incorrectly identified as a pest and then
destroyed, compensation would be payable to the
owner.
A subsequent case challenged a statutory pro-
vision allowing the Department of Agriculture to set
up a valuation schedule for "healthy but suspect"
trees. 140 The valuation schedule was presumed
valid, but could be rebutted in an administrative
hearing. 14' The claimants asserted a right to jury
trial under a provision of the Florida constitution.1
42
The court stated that "[nlo right to a jury trial in
condemnation proceedings existed at common
law," and because the state provided for an "impar-
tial and competent tribunal" held that the owner's
rights were adequately protected. -43 This view of
due process by the Florida court is in accord with
that of the Hawaii courts, as seen in the Sandy
Beach144 and Medeiros14 cases discussed above.
The final Florida case to be discussed is
Department of Agricultural & Consumer Services v. Polk,
146
which again raised a takings claim. After finding
lesions indicative of citrus canker on ten or fewer
newly budded citrus trees in a private nursery, the
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
"destroyed all of the 510,059 citrus nursery trees at
the nursery."147 The trial court ruled that the regula-
tion as applied in this case was "arbitrary and capri-
cious; that the action failed to promote public
139. Id. at 104.
140. See Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1990).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 28.
143. Id. at 28-29.
144. Sandy Beach, 773 P.2d 250.
145. Medeiros v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n. 797 P.2d
59 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990).
146. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So.
2d 35 (Fla. 1990).
147. Id. at 37-38.
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health, safety, or welfare; and that no public harm
was actually prevented by the destruction."148 But
the court al~o noted that the "trees actually dis-
eased, and those trees within 125 feet of the dis-
eased trees, had no marketable value," and required
no compensation. 49 Both of these findings were
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court. 5 However,
the trial judge had excluded "[tlestimony from
members of the citrus industry to which Polk sought
to sell his inventory that they would not have pur-
chased nursery stock from a nursery at which a bac-
terial disease had been discovered.' 5 ' The higher
court found this relevant to the determination of
the amount of compensation due.
15 2
If an invasive species, having been deemed a
pest, is analogous to a diseased tree, it would fol-
low from the holding in Polk that a private property
owner would be entitled to no compensation for
destruction of the pest species because, as a recog-
nized pest, it has no value.153 However, should an
error of identification lead to destruction of an
"innocent" plant, that property owner might be enti-
tled to compensation. 54 If a plant has distinctive,
easily distinguishable features this should not pose
a significant problem, but in less certain situations,
agencies may be required to develop specialized
procedures.
B. California
When the Mediterranean fruit fly (medfly)
threatened California agriculture in 1980-81, then
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. issued several
Emergency Proclamation Orders, and the director of
the Department of Food and Agriculture exercised
statutory authority to address that threat. 155 Some
of the actions taken by the state greatly affected pri-
vate property.
148. Id. at 38.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 43.
151. Id. at 41.
152. See id.
153. Arguably an owner might claim some value as firewood
or for some other purpose in the case of a healthy, but pest plant.
However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, would suggest no compensation is necessary for the
reduction in value incident to a state's valid exercise of police
powers.
154. See Rhyne v. Town of Mount Holly, 112 S.E. 2d 40 (N.C.
1960). In Rhyne, a city ordinance required owners of vacant lots
to remove noxious growth at least twice a year and authorized the
city to do the same of owners failed to do so. When municipal
employees acting under this authority also cut down several oak
trees the size of a person's wrist and twelve to fifteen feet tall, the
One of the earliest medfly cases to reach an
appellate court, Martin v. Municipal Court of Santa
Clara County, actually involved a criminal prosecu-
tion. 56 Pursuant to one of the Governor's Emergency
Proclamation Orders, Mr. Martin, along with other
persons residing in a "quarantine area", had been
ordered to remove all host fruits and vegetables from
trees and plants on his property.157 Failure to comply
carried misdemeanor penalties of either up to six
months in custody or a $500 fine, or both. 58 The
order became effective on July 13, 1981, and on July
28, Martin was notified again and warned. 5 9 He peti-
tioned the Santa Clara County Court for an injunc-
tion and restraining order, which was denied on July
31, 1981.'" "Thereafter, pursuant to an inspection
warrant, a state crew removed 210 pounds of host
fruit from Martin's property."161 Martin was ultimate-
ly convicted of the misdemeanor, and on appeal, his
conviction was upheld because, "[tlhe fact that the
nuisance is ultimately removed does not exonerate
the offender from prosecution."' 62 This holding might
support jurisdictions with similar penal elements in
their pest control statutes. However, as discussed
above, under the Camara rule, if the pest control
statute includes criminal sanctions, the standards for
issuing a warrant are heightened.
Indirect takings were alleged when several insur-
ance companies sought compensation from the state
for losses they paid out for claims of damages to
automobiles caused by aerial spraying of insecti-
cides. 63 While the insurance companies alleged
eight causes of action, one was dismissed voluntari-
ly and the trial court sustained general demurrers on
the remaining seven. 16 The court of appeal agreed to
waive technical defects in the interest of justice and
hear the insurance companies' appeal.165 "[Tlhe med-
fly eradication program was a valid exercise of the
court held the owner was entitled to compensation.
155. See Martin v. Municipal Court of Santa Clara County..







162. Id. at 221.
163. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. State. 221 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct.
App. 1985).
164. See id. at 227.
165. See id.
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state's police power to abate a public nuisance.
Damage to automobile paint incidental to the exer-
cise of this power does not rise to the level of a 'tak-
ing' and is thus noncompensable."166 Regarding tort
claims based on trespass to chattel and nuisance,
the court held that necessity was a complete
defense. 67 "Where the danger affects the entire com-
munity, or so many people that the public interest is
involved, that interest serves as a complete justifica-
tion to the defendant who acts to avert the peril to all
....."1 These holdings might be relevant in the event
of incidental damage to private property while an
agency is engaged in eradicating a plant species. For
example, while cutting down a fifty foot miconia
specimen, falling branches might harm a valuable
ornamental plant or a structure.
This line of cases suggests that in California: (1)
pest eradication efforts are considered under police
powers; (2) incidental property damages are not
necessarily compensable as takings; and (3) there is
a strong presumption that private property owners
will cooperate with state efforts.
C. Special Constitutional Considerations for Hawaii
The Hawaiian Constitution has provisions which
grant certain powers to the state. Among these the
state has "the power to conserve and
develop.. .places of historic or cultural interest and
provide for public sightliness and physical good
order. For these purposes, private property shall be
subject to reasonable regulation."'69 The Hawaiian
Constitution also protects traditional Hawaiian gath-
ering rights. 70 Either of these sections could be
interpreted as granting police power to the state in
166. Id. at 230.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. HAw. CoNsT. art. IX. § 7.
170. See HAW. CONsT. art. XII. § 7. The most recent, and per-
haps most expansive, decision under this provision held that
recognition of customary and traditional native Hawaiian prac-
tices of gathering on undeveloped lands, does not constitute a
judicial taking of private property because concepts of Western
property law (including exclusive use) are not universally applic-
able in Hawaii. See Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii
Planning Comm'n. 903 P. 2d 1246. 1268. 1272 (Haw. 1995) petition
for cert. filed, 95-1159.
171. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. at 279-80.
172. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-3(a) (Michie 1996).
173. See Hawaii Dep't of Agric. Regulations, Title 4. Subtitles
1-5, Ch. 69A (effective Sept. 4, 1993).
174. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 141-3(b) (Michie 1996) (emphasis
added). Under Hawaiian statutes, an "individual" is defined as "a
natural person.- Id. § 92F-3. It would appear from the statutory
language that corporations, partnerships, trusts or similar enti-
situations such as miconia eradication using the
statutes under discussion. For example, if the forests
are threatened by miconia, this might threaten tradi-
tional activities such as flower and plant gathering or
finding timber for ceremonial objects. "lWlhere the
public interest is involved preferment of that interest
over the property interest of the individual, to the
extent even of its destruction, is one of the distin-
guishing characteristics of every exercise of the
police power which affects property."'
7'
VIII. Application of the Relevant Hawaii Statutes
Subsection (a) of section 141-3 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes mandates that the Department of
Agriculture shall establish "criteria and procedures
for the designation of pests for control or eradica-
tion."172 The Department of Agriculture has defined
a number of the statutory terms and developed pro-
cedures to comply with this mandate.
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Subsection (b) of section 141-3 requires the
Department to, "as far as reasonably practicable,
assist, free of cost to individuals, in the ... eradication
if ... noxious weeds, or other pests injurious to veg-
etation of value .... "171 There is also suggestion that,
under certain agricultural loan programs, any eradi-
cation plan couild be the primary responsibility of
the property owner, with the state only serving to
"assist" in controlling efforts. 75 From an environ-
mental perspective, the phrase "vegetation of value"
could mean any indigenous specie, but the legisla-
tive intent may have been simply to protect com-
mercial crops. 76 In putting the statutes into effect,
the Department of Agriculture may have expanded
ties would be ineligible for the "free of cost to individuals" eradi-
cation assistance. See Id. § 141-3(b). The definition of "person"
would have included the other entities. See Id. § 92F-3.
175. Borrowers under some state agricultural loan programs
are statutorily required to "keep land free from noxious weeds"
and if they are in default of this condition, "the whole of the loan
shall, at the option of the lender, become due and payable forth-
with." Id. § 155-12. The Department of Agriculture also engages in
cooperative control projects with landowners. See supra note 62
and accompanying text. However, after notification of a landown-
er, "the department may entirely undertake the eradication or
control project when it has been determined that the owner,
occupier, or lessee of the land on which the infestation is located
will not benefit materially or financially by the control or eradica-
tion of the noxious weed." HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-6(e) (Michie
1996).
176. This possible limitation is suggested by the fact that
the emergency provision is applicable only if the department
finds an infestation is or is likely to become injurious "to-the agri-
cultural, horticultural, aquacultural, or livestock industries of the
State without immediate action .... HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-
3(c) (Michie 1996) (emphasis added). However, other parts of the
statutes contain no such limitation.
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on that intent when they defined "noxious
weeds."'171 "'Noxious weeds' means those plant
species determined to be or likely to become injurious,
harmful, or deleterious to the agricultural industry,
forest and recreational areas, and conservation districts of the
State and which are designated and listed as nox-
ious weeds ....178
The emergency provisions of subsection (c),
allowing for exceptions to the notice requirement,
are limited to pests that are or are likely to become
injurious to the "agricultural, horticultural, aquacul-
tural or livestock industries of the State without imme-
diate action .... ,179 From the plain language of the
statute, the emergency provisions would generally
be unavailable for the protection-of natural ecosys-
tems in many situations. Only if an "industry" were
also threatened would these measures be utilized.
For example, if an alien specie caused damage to a
watershed because its root system increased ero-
sion, would this indirect threat to "industry" be
enough to trigger emergency provisions, and would
the courts agree? 180 What if "renewable" products are
gathered or harvested in the Hawaiian rainforest and
sold? Would this be an agricultural industry within
the meaning of the statute, allowing for possible
emergency action against a threat like miconia?
Next, section 141-3.5 (a) of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes directs that the Department of Agriculture
"shall develop and implement a detailed control or
eradication program for any pest designated in 141-
3, using the best available technology in a manner con-
sistent with state and federal law."' 8' Any "detailed"
plan should specifically address eradication of
pests on private property, including the provisions
for notice and opportunity to be heard noted earli-
er. "Best available technology" is a term of art that,
in its simplest form, is the highest standard of con-
177. Hawaii Dep't of Agric. Regulations, Title 4, Subtitle 6,
Chapter 69A (effective Sept. 4, 1993).
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. . 141-3(c) (Michie 1996) (emphasis
added).
180. There is a great deal of room for "agency interpretation"
here. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837. For example, the department could determine
that the watershed damage caused by the shallow root system of
miconia would or would not damage agricultural industries. If the
department determined that it would cause the damage, it would
still need to determine if the injury could only be averted through
immediate action or if the regular statutory procedures are ade-
quate.
181. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-3.5 (Michie 1996) (emphasis
added).
182. In the Hawaii Revised Statutes, the phrase "best avail-
able technology" appears only in this section and a section relat-
ing to non-point source pollution (See id. § 342E-3(a)(9)).
trols available; only the limits of technology would
circumscribe the methods of control or eradica-
tion. 182 However, this may conflict with the "so far as
reasonably practicable, assist, free of cost" provi-
sion in section 141.3, in that technology might be
limited by the cost element of that language.
Finally, section 141-3.6 is the most procedural-
ly detailed of the relevant statutes.8 1 Subsection (a)
sets out the Department of Agriculture's responsi-
bility to give "at least five days notice to the
landowners and occupier of any private property of
its intention to enter the property for the control or
eradication of a pest."' 84 While the statute states
that the "notice shall set forth all pertinent informa-
tion on the pest control program," 8 5 as noted earli-
er, it would be prudent to include provision for
some type of opportunity to be heard in order to
satisfy due process requirements.
As discussed previously, this section of the
statute goes on to allow the Department to autho-
rize agents to carry out the eradication program
and, significantly, sets limits to potential liability. If
local government entities were authorized as
"agents" by the Department of Agriculture, some
questions are presented: What agencies would be
available and capable of carrying out some portion
of an eradication program? Could an agent be
authorized to give the necessary notice, or must
that emanate from the Department of Agriculture?
IX. Conclusions I Recommendations
Fragile and unique ecosystems are easily
threatened by non-indigenous plant species.
Recent interest among the (less fragile) mainland
states in control and eradication programs relating
to non-indigenous species, 86 suggests an increas-
Nowhere is the term defined in the Statutes. Cf. 33 U.S.C.S. §
1314(b)(1)(B) & (b)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1996) (federal Clean Water
Act discusses and defines lower standard of "best practicable
control technology" and higher "best available technology" stan-
dard in context of that statute).
183. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-3.6 (Michie 1996).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Minnesota directed their Commissioner of Natural
Resources to develop a comprehensive management plan for
"ecologically harmful exotic species." HARMFUL NIS, supra note 2.
at 219. Illinois' Department of Conservation and California's park
system have begun emphasizing use of native species over alien
species (in Illinois this extends to soil conservation, landscaping,
wildlife habitat and other public purposes). See id. at 227-228(Box
7-E). Montana funds its weed control programs through a
Noxious Weed Trust Fund (money derives from a surcharge on
retail herbicide sales and "vehicle weed fees" imposed through
auto registration). See id. at 225.
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ing recognition of the harm that frequently follows
introduction of these organisms. While measures
such as the Lacey Act' 87 or similar state measures
are a part of any control strategy, even the most
stringent of such programs is fallible. Eradication
statutes for pest species may become increasingly
necessary if introductions of harmful species con-
tinue at the current high rate. The experiences of
Florida and California, as well as the earlier nui-
sance law cases, provide some considerations for
use of such laws in an environmental arena. There is
a need for application of localized nuisance abate-
ment control statutes in responding to alien
species. A clear strategy for using such statutes and
clarification of the elements necessary to imple-
ment them should reduce property owner hostility
to such intrusions.
Education of private landowners regarding the
nature of the pest problem should be a high priori-
ty. This should considerably reduce resistance to
eradication programs from the landowners. When
included in any notice issued pursuant to statutes
like Hawaii's section 141-3.6, such information
should decrease the likelihood of any subsequent
claims against the state. To avoid litigation, clear
information setting out the state's authority should
be provided.
With a pest such as miconia, there is significant
likelihood that additional plants will later appear
on the same property. Thus, it will simplify follow-
up inspections if this is communicated early in the
process and if considerable deference is afforded
the property owner in scheduling convenient times
for follow-up inspections and so forth.
It is appropriate to clarify aspects of the notice
requirement. What agencies or officers will be
responsible and authorized to mail or otherwise
give notice? The notice should set out what the
agency expects from the landowner (e.g., whether a
gate should be let open or the landowner should be
present) and should set out any penalties for failure
to cooperate, as in the Martin case. To carry out
187. 16 U.S.C.S. § 3371-3378 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
188. Nordmann, 473 So. 2d 278; Denney, 462 So. 2d 534; Mid-
Florida Growers, 521 So. 2d 101; Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24; Polk, 568 So.
2d 35.
189. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272.
190. See WANTED, supra note 13.
eradication programs most expediently, penalties
for failure to cooperate, if any, should be limited to
civil penalties, such as cost of eradication and/or
fines. If the penalties carry any criminal sanctions,
any subsequent request for a warrant for entry onto
the subject property must meet higher criminal
standards of probable cause under the Camara line
of cases. Finally, as, discussed, the notice must
include availability of some forum for an "opportu-
nity to be heard."
Education of the public may enlist aid in early
detection of pests, but this must be subject to veri-
fication. Miller v. Schoene's holding made it clear that
an authorized, responsible agent of the state must
verify that the plant identified by the public is
indeed a pest specie. Similarly, the Florida citrus
canker cases' 88 make it clear that if the state
destroys a non-pest plant in error, they will proba-
bly be required to compensate the owner. Thus, any
pest eradication program should be certain that
plants designated for destruction are clearly identi-
fied by qualified agents. As in Miller v. Schoene,189 the
Hawaii Department of Agriculture has enlisted the
help of the public in locating miconia, including
that on private property, with a "wanted poster" type
campaign. 90
Efforts to eradicate harmful, non-indigenous
species through local or state pest abatement laws
will have the greatest opportunity to succeed if
implemented with the recommendations discussed
above. The case law suggests that any legal chal-
lenges mounted by private landowners would not
be successful. Any reticence of government officials
to utilize these statutes to eradicate alien species, if
based upon fear of such challenges, is probably
misplaced, especially when time is critical to suc-
cess. While these local and state laws are only one
component in comprehensive efforts to combat the
ecological threats posed by alien species, they are a
necessary and potentially effective tool that should
be given a chance to succeed.
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